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Telemedicine and Legal Disruption 
I. INTRODUCTION 
'"Science has eliminated distance,' Melquiades proclaimed. 'In a short time, man will be 
able to see what is happening in any place in the world without leaving his own house.'"1 
The invention of the automobile had a profound effect on the health care industry. The 
automobile made many physicians feel "as if the day had forty-eight hours instead 
of twenty-four."2 The car, along with the general urbanization of the United States, 
saved doctors and patients tremendous amounts of time and greatly expanded health 
care markets. Yet not all doctors appreciated the new technology. Transportation also 
increased competition among doctors by allowing patients to see physicians from 
different towns. 3 A common theme of new technologies held true for the automobile in 
its relationship to health care: there are winners and losers. 
The growth of telemedicine has generated similarly mixed reactions from the medical 
community. To some, telemedicine represents a phenomenal opportunity to expand 
access for patients and decrease costs for doctors. One study of the Virtuwell system 
in Minnesota found that average cost decreased $88 per episode.4 Another analysis 
indicated that Teladoc, a large telehealth company, increased access to patients who are 
not otherwise connected to providers.5 The telemedicine market is expected to be worth 
over $34 billion by 2020, with North America accounting for more than 40% of that 
total.6 In 2016 alone, forty-four states considered new legislation to regulate the growth 
of telemedicine. 7 
Some groups have been more resistant to the technology's development. Most notably, 
the Texas Medical Board issued new guidelines defining a proper physician-patient 
relationship as including a face-to-face meeting unless telemedicine consultations 
occurred at "distant site providers."8 Texas may have relied on studies like the one found 
in Journal of American Medicine showing "significant variation in quality" across 
telemedicine providers in the management of acute illness. 9 While the jury is still out on 
1 GABRJEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS or SournDE 2 (trans. Gregory Rabassa, First 
Harper Perennial Modem Classics ed. 2006). 
2 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 70 (1982). For another 
~~·"P'~'"'~" of telemedicine to the introduction of automobile, see Alison M. Sulentic, 
Borders: The Licensure 
STARR, supra note 2, at 77. 
Telemedicine Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIS. 1, 1 (1999). 
4 Patrick T. Courneya et aL, HealthPartners 'Online Clinic For Conditions Delivers 
Access to 
(2014) 
32 HEALTHAFF. 385, 387 (2013). 
Use Seems to Indicate i',x11an.1ea 
Without Prior Connection to A Provider, 33 HEALTH AFF. 258, 263 
6 Bernie Monegain, Telemedicine Market to Soar Past $30B, HEALTHCAREITNEws (Ang. 4, 2015), 
Licensees. 
9 Adam l Schoenfeld et al., Variation in Care 
Commercial Virtual Visits, 176 JAl'v1A INTERNAL MED. 635, 636 (2016). 
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various particular uses of telemedicine, the industry is growing and creating new legal 
and practical questions. 
This Article argues that telemedicine is not legally disruptive. As of now, the technology 
has not fundamentally altered the legal underpinnings of health law. Telemedicine is 
defined as the use of virtual audio-visual interactions to deliver clinical health services 
while a patient and physician are physically separated. 10 A meaningful number of health 
care interactions no longer require the joint presence of both patient and physician. The 
car allowed physicians to get around quicker, while telemedicine may remove the need 
to get around at all. 
This Article considers three key areas of law and regulation to demonstrate that 
telemedicine is not legally disruptive. Part II provides further detail on the meaning 
and significance oflegal disruption. Part III addresses the physician-patient relationship 
and whether the removal of physicality as a structurally necessary component of that 
relationship is disruptive. 11 Telemedicine arguably upends, or so Blum suggests, the 
"special human relationship" joining physicians and patients. 12 Yet the pillar on which 
the physician-patient relationship rests is one of contractual consent-physicians must 
agree to the establishment of the relationship-not physicality. 13 Moreover, these 
relationships have already been established without physical interaction via telephone 
and through consultations from doctors. 14 
Part IV assesses the effect of telemedicine on physician licensure, which currently 
operates through state-based licensing laws. 15 The state-based licensing system 
supposedly prevents the interstate practice of telemedicine, and many view licensing 
as the most significant burden to the widespread use of the technology. 16 The physical 
10 This definition stems from New York state law, which defines "telemedicine" as "use of 
synchronous, 1wo-way electronic audio-visual communications to deliver clinical health care 
services, which shall include the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of a patient, while such 
a patient is at the originating site and a telehealth provider is at a distant site." NY Pub. Health 
Law § 2999-cc-5 (2019). This Article does not address the broader digitization of health care, 
including electronic health records and mobile health applications. For a thorough consideration 
of these issues, see ROBERT WACHTER, THE DIGITAL DOCTOR: HOPE, HYPE, AND HARM AT THE DAWN OF 
l\1EmcrNE's COMPUTER AGE (2015). Telemedicine further stands in contrast to telehealth, which more 
generally includes the use of "electronic information communication technologies by telehealth 
providers." NY Pub. Health§ 2999-cc-4 (2019). 
11 See Part It 
12 See Blum, supra note 50, at 413. 
13 Compare Williams v. United States, 242 F3d 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding no obligation on 
Cherokee Indian Hospital to treat non-Indian suffering respiratory distress), and Esquivel v. Watters, 
154 P3d 1184 (Kan. Ct App. 2007) (finding no relationship between patient and hospital where 
hospital only agreed to provide free gender determination and did not identify defect in pregnancy), 
with Ricks v. Budge, 64 P2d 208 (Utah 1937) (finding a physician-patient relationship continued 
even when patient had unpaid bills). 
14 See Section IILB. 
15 See Pait UL 
16 See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffman & Virginia Rowthorn, Legal Impediments to the 
Telemedicine, 141 HEALTH CAREL & Prno'Y l (2011) ("As a foundational matter, Roundtable 
participants acknowledged that the historical model of state licensure is a constraint on the growing 
3 
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separation of the physician from the patient does not prevent states from effectively 
regulating quality of care. Part V discusses the issue of data security, a primary concern 
for many health care experts in the age of digitization. 17 While telemedicine certainly 
creates new challenges for data protection, it is not legally disruptive on this issue. For 
one, the industry has already adopted and encouraged a massive expansion of electronic 
health records, and telemedicine does not meaningfully exacerbate this challenge. 18 
The complications of data security can also be resolved through the existing framework 
that attempts to manage security issues while embracing the utility of digitization in 
health care. Existing rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA)19 may require change, but these adjustments are not disruptive in 
nature. Part VI offers lessons learned from this analysis of telemedicine regarding how 
to generally assess whether a new technology is legally disruptive and concludes that 
the existing law for these three areas is amenable to telemedicine and can adjust through 
modifications. 20 
II. UNDERSTANDING LEGAL DISRUPTION 
This Article contends with whether this development is legally disruptive. 21 Telemedicine 
is legally disruptive if it requires reconsideration and ultimate adjustment of the core legal 
and regulatory principles of health law. The use of "requires" is somewhat misleading, 
however, because introduction of a new technology rarely requires changes to existing 
law. Law can stubbornly remain antiquated in the face of new technology, though 
evidently not ideal. Put simply, a new technology is legally disruptive when it both cannot 
be accommodated through existing legal structures and should be accommodated for its 
social value.22 There are two important factors to consider when applying this definition 
field of telemedicine but agreed that any alternative must preserve the goals of licensure-to protect 
the public from incompetent physicians and sub-standard care."). 
17 See Part IV 
18 See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. 
111-5 (2009) (providing substantial incentives for adoption of electronic medical records); see also 
Howard Burde, The HITECH Act: An Overview, AMA JOURNAL OF Enucs: HEALTll LAW (Mar. 2011), 
http://joumalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/hitech-act-overview /2011-03. 
19 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat 1936 (1996) 
20 See PartVL 
21 By legally disruptive, I do not mean to invoke Clayton Christensen's definition of disruption 
whereby smaller companies push out incumbents by moving downstream, offering more functional 
services at a lower price, and eventually moving up the food chain. See Clayton M. Christensen et 
al., What is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. Bus. REv. 44-53 (2015). For one, while there is some 
evidence of this process in telemedicine, large incumbents are arguably best positioned to accrue the 
benefits of the new technology. New York Presbyterian, to some the most prestigious hospital and 
health system in New York City, recently announced the creation of Digital Urgent Care and Virtual 
Visit through their NYP OnDemand app. See New York-Presbyterian Launches Digital Urgent Care 
and Virtual Visit with NYP OnDemand, NY-Presbyterian (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.nyp.org/news/ 
NYP-Launches-Digital-Urgent-Care-and-Virtual-Visit. Like other forms of economically disruptive 
innovation, telemedicine will likely decrease costs and increase access to new customers. 
22 Ryan Calo offers a "moderate conception that holds technologies to be exceptional if the best 
reconciliation of societal values leads to systemic changes to law or institutions." See Ryan Calo, 
4 
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of legal disruption. First, the extent to which a technology is legally disruptive will 
depend in part on how much the technology alters human capabilities.23 It is likely that 
a technology modestly expanding human capabilities should be accommodated through 
the existing legal regime. Electronic car windows are not legally disruptive because 
they do not meaningfully expand human capabilities.24 A car that can fly, or drive itself, 
alternatively, can be legally disruptive. 
The second relevant factor is the flexibility of the underlying doctrine. Drones are 
an expansion of human capabilities but, perhaps more importantly to their legal 
disruptiveness, there are justifiably strict regulations surrounding the national airspace. 
This regulation is clearly structured around commercial airplanes and not unmanned 
aerial vehicles. Douglas Marshall has argued that the lack of an explicit statutory 
mandate for the Federal Aviation Administration to regulate drones has led to a "perilous 
journey" and messy administrative process for regulating unmanned aerial vehicles.25 
Alternatively, a very novel technology may not be legally disruptive if its role is in an 
already lax or flexible legal regime. While we accurately think of health care as a heavily 
regulated industry, many of the underlying legal doctrines are quite flexible. Much of 
the physician-patient relationship revolves around the contractual concept of consent, 
a doctrine highly amenable to telemedicine.26 Health care is a constantly changing 
industry, and any legal doctrine must be responsive to new modes of delivery of care. 
Though there is general acknowledgment that telemedicine may be a source of 
market disruption, 27 scholars have not explicitly considered the question of legal 
disruption. Many scholars have effectively applied traditional principles of health 
law to telemedicine when assessing its potential effect.28 For example, Phyllis 
Forrester Granade, addressing telemedicine's effect on medical malpractice as early 
as 1997, recognized that "[t]elemedicine malpractice cases might be characterized 
Robotics and the Lessons 103 CALIF. L. REv. 513, 550 (2015). Calo's is a broad 
one but I his logic to the narrower question of legal A nonnative 
judgment as to the value of a new technology is required to assess its 
23 This is based upon Donald Schon's definition of technology as tool or teclurique, any 
or process, any or method or making, by which human 
cap,ab1lltv extended." Donald Schon, TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE 1 (1967). 
24 Lyria Bennett Moses notes that "traffic mies would continue to apply to cars with electric 
windows." See Bennett Moses, Have a and 8 
MINN. J. L. Ser. & TECH. 589, 596 (2007). 
25 See Marshall, vVhat a Long Trip Its Been: A Journey the FAA 's Drone 
Ke·f!uf,atums. 65 DEPAUL L. REv. 123, 123 (2016). 
26 See Section II.A. 
27 Thomas R. McLean, The Future & Its Faustian Reliance on Trade 
Protection, 16 HEALTH l\1ATRIJC J. LAW-MEDICINE 443, 450 (2006) ("Telemedicine is an 
of a 'disruptive innovation,' i.e. an im1ovation that allows a service to be nrrmHiPrl 
and in a more convenient fashion than traditional medicine."). 
28 See, e.g., John D. Blum, Internet lvfedicine and the 
ffP111n,nn.,wn 24 J. LEGAL MED. 413, 414 (2003); 
Telemedicine and Legal Disruption 
Ways in Which Telecommunications 
73 N.D. L. REV. 65, 90 (1997) 
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as the application of old law to new delivery mechanisms."29 Similarly, John Blum 
demonstrated how traditional bases forthe physician-patient relationship can be applied 
to telemedicine.30 At the same time, these and other authors have used extraordinary 
language to describe the change brought on by telemedicine. Carl F. Ameringer, writing 
in the Journal of Health Care Law and Policy, states that "telemedicine's potential 
for altering the course of health care delivery is transcendent."31 Blum himself notes 
that "unlike other changes . . . cybermedicine alters the core relationship between 
physician and patient by removing the once-constant element of physicality."32 The 
existing scholarship regarding application of legal principles to telemedicine stands 
in sharp contrast to the exceptional language used to describe the potential change 
brought by telemedicine. 
The question of legal disruption must be explicitly isolated from other forms of 
disruption. Lawrence Lessig identifies four modalities of regulation: law, market, 
norms, and architecture.33 However, the four modalities do not exist in isolation; rather, 
"[ c ]hanges in any one will affect the regulation of the whole."34 To contextualize within 
telemedicine, it is possible that new technology could disrupt the market sufficiently so 
as to make the concept of a hospital (and legal concepts like the corporate practice of 
medicine) unstable, thereby causing legal disruption. It is for precisely this reason that 
it is critical to specifically identify where legal disruption, as opposed to disruptions of 
norms or markets, occurs. 
The potential for abuse of the language of disruption in telemedicine can be seen in 
other industries. Consider the disruption created by rideshare companies like Uber.35 
Legislators are unlikely to be concerned about potential harm to the taxi industry, 
presuming Uber's technology creates a better service for consumers. 36 Rather, the 
potentially convincing argument is that Uber unfairly classifies its drivers as independent 
contractors instead of employees, thereby avoiding labor regulations.37 When the 
California Labor Commission held that certain Uber drivers are employees, the National 
29 Granade, supra note 28, at 90. 
30 Blum, supra note 28, at 414. 
31 Carl F. State-Based Licensure The 
National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CAREL. & PoL'Y 55, 56 (2011). 
32 Blum, supra note 28, at 414. 
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 123 (2006). 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Walter Isaacson, How Uber and Airbnb Became Poster 
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), 
36 Andre Andoyan, Note, mc.1ev<,naem 
onmrmo Should Create an 1~x1;ep1czon 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 153, 155 (2017). 
See id. 
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Taxi Workers Alliance president celebrated that there finally exists "a set of laws Uber 
has not been allowed to violate or skirt."38 
If those who stand to lose from telemedicine 's potential market disruption are instead 
able to frame the issue as a threat to the legal underpinnings ofhealth law, telemedicine's 
impact may be unfairly limited. Alternatively, if telemedicine proponents can falsely 
claim that detractors are actually masking their economic incentives despite legitimate 
potential for legal disruption, telemedicine will be adopted before legal structures can 
effectively adjust. As this Article demonstrates, however, the extent of regulation in 
health care does not translate into rigid legal doctrine. In fact, a theme of consent, either 
on behalf of the physician, state government, or patient, emerges across the issues. It 
is no surprise that various critical health law doctrines have already survived decades 
of pivotal changes to the industry. Though the removal of the physical component of 
the relationship with providers is significant, it does not diminish the fundamentally 
consensual nature of our health care system. As a result, telemedicine does not legally 
disrupt health law. 
III. TELEMEDICINE AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
A. Consent Is The Basis For The Physician-Patient Relationship 
Telemedicine's most fundamental and tangible threat to the medical-legal framework 
is that it removes the physicality from the physician-patient relationship. John D. Blum 
suggests that the physician-patient dyad constitutes the basic structure of medicine 
historically, though we have certainly moved far from that with the introduction 
of hospitals, corporate practice of medicine, and managed care. 39 Blum further 
acknowledges that "[t]he element of physicality may be traditional, but it is not 
essential to the existence of the physician-patient relationship."40 The basic foundation 
of the physician-patient relationship is contractual consent, and a physical meeting 
is simply one way of demonstrating consent. Telemedicine is not legally disruptive 
of the physician-patient relationship because consent to such a relationship can be 
established virtually. 
The question of how the physician-patient relationship will be changed by telemedicine 
has been at the forefront oftelemedicine literature for decades. Writing in 1997, Phyllis 
Forrester Granade identified five questions a court asks to determine if a physician-
patient relationship exists: 
( 1) [W]hether the consultant and the patient have met; (2) whether the consultant 
ever examined the patient; (3) whether the patient's records were ever viewed 
by the consultant; (4) whether the consulting physician knew the patient's 
ro Labor Commission Game 
Are NAT'L TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE (June 2015), 
static/ 551 cOfb le4b04e2cba203b00/t/5 5 81 cfa2e4b03cc04d6801ad/143457065 8578/NTW A +and+SF 
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name; and (5) whether the consultation was gratuitous or for a fee. Importantly, 
only a few of these elements must be met to establish a relationship.41 
Each of these areas require action on the part of the physician. Physician consent is 
a necessary and fundamental component of the physician-patient relationship.42 The 
Federation of State Medical Boards recommends in its telemedicine policies that "the 
relationship is clearly established when the physician agrees to undertake the diagnosis 
and treatment of the patient, and the patient agrees to be treated, whether or not there has 
been an encounter in person between the physician ... and [the] patient."43 
Childs v. Weis, through a disturbing set of facts due to the element of racism, demonstrates 
the contractual nature of the relationship.44 In Childs, a pregnant African American 
woman traveling through rural Texas presented herself to the Greenville Hospital 
emergency room.45 The nurse examined her, then called the doctor and informed him 
there was "a negro girl in the emergency room" having pregnancy-related issues.46 The 
nurse advised the woman to drive back to her own doctor in Dallas. While driving back 
to her hospital, the woman gave birth, but the child ultimately died within twelve hours.47 
The court held that there was no physician-patient relationship, as the relationship "in its 
inception is basically contractual and wholly voluntary, created by agreement express 
or implied, and which by its terms may be general or limited."48 Since the doctor never 
agreed to treat the patient and sent the patient away, no duty existed. 
Concerns regarding the physician-patient relationship are especially relevant because 
establishing the existence of such a relationship is necessary in a medical malpractice 
case. In the standard framework for a common law tort of duty-breach-causing-injury, 
the physician-patient relationship is required to establish the duty.49 In the early days 
of telemedicine, there was a swath of scholarship addressing the coming crisis for 
practitioners in terms of medical malpractice risk, but these concerns were overblown 
given that telemedicine has remained mostly limited to areas of medicine with limited 
numbers of claims (e.g., primary care). In fact, there have been a bafflingly low number 
of claims. Teladoc announced in 2016 that it had zero malpractice claims in its first one 
41 See Granade, supra note 28, at 69 (1997) (citations omitted). 
42 Valarie Blake, When Is a 
ETHICS 403, 404 ("As a 
choose to."). 
unless 
43 JViODEL Poucy FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF TELEMEDICINE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRACTICE OF 
MEDICINE, FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS (2014), 
44 See Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. App. 1969). This case occurred before the 
of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which treatment of 
anyone f""'o"'""''S to an emergency de]Jant1mmt. 
45 Id. at 105. 
46 Id. at 106. 
47 Id. at 105. 
48 Id. at 107 Parks, 343 P2d 118, 123 (1959)). 
49 See Miller v. 
liable for an act of medical "'"'J.J"~""""• 
existence at the time the 
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million visits.50 The Medical Director of American Well, another very large provider of 
telemedicine services, stated in 2014 that "[not] only have we not had any malpractice 
claims, we've not had any physicians brought before medical boards."51 As telemedicine 
technology improves and allows for more complex medical encounters without in-
person meetings this may change, but as of now the telemedicine malpractice crisis has 
been utterly absent. 
B. Current Laws Already Allow Physician-Patient Relationships Without 
Physical Interaction 
Telemedicine does not present the first occasion on which doctors have practiced 
medicine on individual patients without being physically present. In an extreme example, 
a lower court in New York considered whether a patient simply telephoning to schedule 
an appointment created a physician-patient relationship.52 The court denied a motion for 
summary judgment by the defendant, concluding that whether there was a physician-
patient relationship based upon the scheduled appointment was a question of fact for 
the jury.53 In another case, Dr. Rodriguez, a general practitioner with staff privileges 
at a hospital who was on call approved the transfer of an eight-month pregnant patient 
to another hospital based only on a recitation of the circumstances on the phone with 
two nurses.54 The patient died during the trip, and the court found that "in evaluating 
the status of Mrs. Wheeler's labor and giving his approval, [Dr. Rodriguez] established 
a doctor-patient relationship with Mrs. Wheeler and accepted the duties which flow 
from such a relationship."55 Before the advent of telemedicine, physicality was not a 
necessary component of the physician-patient relationship. 
This has been particularly true in the area of physician-to-physician consultations. 
Courts have been consistently willing to find a physician-patient relationship to exist 
(given certain factual circumstances) in the context of such consultations, even though 
the doctor never actually speaks with the patient. In Cogswell v. Chapman, an infant 
arrived at the emergency room with an eye injury from a fishing accident.56 The 
defendant, William Eichner, was a "courtesy/consulting physician at the hospital" 
and only provided a recommended treatment via a phone call to the emergency room 
physician. 57 The court acknowledged that "exposure to liability of a consulting physician 
is limited," but nevertheless affirmed that an issue of fact existed regarding Eichner's 
potential physician-patient relationship.58 In general, as Phyllis Forrester Granade has 
51 Neil Chesanow, Do Virtual Patients Increase Your Risk Sued:/, MEDSCAPE (Oct 22, 
2014 ), 11ttrr//\vw1;v. m:eds:can1e.c1Jlll! 
SJ [d at 140. 
54 Wheclerv. Yettie Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W2d 32, 35 (Tex. App. 1993) 
56 
Id at 460. 
58 Id. at 
Lruipnian, 672 NYS.2d 460, 461 (NY App. Div. 1998) 
Te!emedicine and Legal Disruption 
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acknowledged, "[N]o physician-patient relationship develops between the patient and 
the consultant if the consultant informally offers his or her opinion to another physician 
regarding an anonymous patient's care."59 If the consultation occurs in a more formal, 
scheduled setting, however, a relationship will likely be established. 
When a physician is an employee of the same hospital and consistently serves as a 
consulting physician, especially in a specialist role, courts are more likely to find a 
physician-patient relationship.6° Courts are also likely to establish such a relationship if 
the physician recommends a specific course of medical treatment, reviews the patient's 
chart, and performs similar actions that constitute the practice ofmedicine.61 Physicians 
who serve as a hospital resource for certain types of patients are presumed to have 
accepted a duty towards the patients on the other end of their medical opinion without 
having met them.62 Alternatively, an occasional willingness to provide a doctor with 
advice appears far from consent to a relationship. In the context of consultations, 
actually seeing the patient is a presumably sufficient but not necessary component of 
establishing a physician-patient relationship. 
The ability to hold managed care organizations accountable for medical malpractice 
further demonstrates that physicality is not an absolute requirement of the physician-
patient relationship. To be clear, this does not refer to cases in which doctors, ostensibly 
working as independent contractors, are found to actually act as employees or apparent 
agents of the managed care organization. 63 This is unlike a claim of corporate negligence 
under the doctrine relied upon Thompson v. Nason Hospital. 64 Rather, courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to find managed care organizations liable for effectively 
practicing medicine not in accordance with the standard of care. In Shannon v. McNulty, 
the plaintiff suffered from labor complications and spoke with registered nurses via an 
on-call number that HealthAmerica, the plaintiff's Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO), provided for emergency purposes.65 The underlying rationale of the decision 
is that the HMO "was under a duty to oversee that the dispensing of advice by those 
nurses would be performed in a medically reasonable manner."66 The HMO had entered 
into a physician-patient-like relationship by providing the emergency nurse service and 
59 See Granade, supra note 28, at 69. 
60 But see, e.g., Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983 (D. C. Ct App. 2010) that obstetrician 
did not have and therefore no vv'""'cmvu 
nurse-midwives). 
61 See id. at 1004-11 (J. Ruiz, aissentm:gJ 
62 
treatment and does so."). 
63 For an of a held liable in such a case, see Petrovich v. 
Share Health Plan of Jllinois, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (IIL 1999). 
64 591 A2d 703 (Pa. 1991) four duties of under which corporate 
"~''"F•~"'-~ claims could succeed). 
65 718 A2d 828 (Pa. Ct 1998) 
66 Id. at 836. 
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was accordingly liable.67 Evidently, physicality is better understood as a strong signal of 
consent rather than itself being the basis for a physician-patient relationship. 
C.After Formation, Legislation Can Restrict The Extent Of The Physician-
Patient Relationship 
Telemedicine does not necessarily challenge the core legal underpinning of the 
physician-patient relationship. Physicians and their patients can certainly consent via the 
internet; individuals and organizations consent to all forms of agreements online. This 
is not to say, however, that telemedicine presents no threats to the role of consent in the 
physician-patient relationship. Indeed, telemedicine companies have apparently gone 
out of their way to attempt to claim that its doctors were not entering into physician-
patient relationships. 68 Much of the legislation responding to telemedicine in the context 
of the physician-patient relationship focuses on ensuring that telemedicine is not treated 
as an exception to the standard doctrine. 
Many states have passed laws, through their Medical Boards or otherwise, confirming 
that a physician-patient relationship may exist through telemedicine.69 Arkansas, for 
example, recently passed an amendment to its Medical Practice Act specifically including 
the following as a potential method of establishing a physician-patient relationship: 
"The physician performs a face-to-face examination using real time audio and visual 
telemedicine technology that provides information at least equal to such information as 
would have been obtained by an in-person examination."70 Arkansas repealed the law 
this year under the Telemedicine-Arkansas Internet Prescription Consumer Protection 
Act and now requires an in-person relationship before telemedicine can be utilized.71 
The Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners adopted a policy similar to the original 
Arkansas policy, stating that "[a] physician-patient relationship exists when a physician 
serves a patient's medical needs whether or not there has been an encounter in person 
between the physician and patient."72 States are clarifying through legislation what 
likely would have been presumed by courts anyway: physician-patient relationships are 
established through telemedicine just like through in-person interactions via consent. 
Simply acknowledging that telemedicine establishes a physician-patient relationship 
fails to address the real challenge of what exactly doctors can do via telemedicine. 
States are more aggressively reining in the extent to which virtual interactions may 
lead to serious medical decision-making. This issue is particularly pronounced in the 
prescribing of dangerous narcotics. One recent study focusing on Sinusitis and Urinary 
67 Id 
68 Colette Delong et al., Websites That Care Over the Internet: Ls There an Access 
311 J. AM. Iv1En. Ass'N 1287, 1288 (Apr. 2, 2014) ("[A]nd one [website] asserts that its 
service 'does not constitute a pJ:n1sic:iant-P8ttmnt n:!at1onshl1P. 
70 
71 
CoDEANN. § 17-80-118. 
ARK. ACTS 203. 
72 TENN. CoDEJ\NN. § 0880-02-16 (West2017). 
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Tract Infections found that "physicians were more likely to prescribe an antibiotic at 
an e-visit for either condition," describing this as a "conservative approach" when 
physicians cannot see the patient in person.73 The rise of on-demand prescriptions is a 
serious concern for telemedicine. One website, Ezdoctorsrx.com, at least for some time 
guaranteed a prescription or your money back. 74 In the early days of telemedicine, there 
were many companies that appeared to serve as easy methods of obtaining prescriptions. 
The Federation of State Medical Boards issued guidelines recommending that issuing 
prescriptions based solely on an online questionnaire is not appropriate.75 Now, states 
are enacting regulation to resist the easy transmission of prescriptions via telemedicine. 
Many states have passed blanket bans on the prescription of dangerous drugs via 
telemedicine. In 2015, Connecticut passed An Act Concerning the Facilitation of 
Telehealth, which included the provision that "no telehealth provider shall prescribe 
Schedule I, II, or III controlled substances through the use of telehealth."76 Delaware 
takes a different approach, prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing prescription drugs if 
he or she knows that the prescription stemmed only from a telemedicine consultation.77 
There is undeniably a relationship in that legislators want to limit the prescription of 
drugs because telemedicine, in its current technological state, may not be an appropriate 
avenue for this type of physician-patient relationship. The contractual core of the 
physician-patient relationship remains, but these laws limit what care may be provided 
under the contract. 
Limitations on the extent of the physician-patient relationship is not unique to 
telemedicine. Established health law doctrine recognizes the need to limit the actions 
oflicensed physicians. The contractual requirement of informed consent demands, for 
example, that "a physician is under a legal duty to disclose to the patient all material 
information."78 Therefore, doctors cannot perform procedures or recommend courses 
of action without making the patient aware of the relevant risks.79 If a physician 
practices outside their area of expertise they are much more likely to be held liable 
for violating the standard of care and face sanctions from the state medical board. 80 
The fact that there must be new rules regarding what types of interactions can legally 
occur via telemedicine is not a disruption of the underlying law. Simply because a new 
technology complicates a doctrine or demands assessment of new questions does not 
create legal disruption. Therefore, physician-patient relationship established through 
73 Ateey Mehrotra et al., A at E-Visits Sinusitis 
and Urinary Traci 173 J. AM. MED AsSN'N.: INTERNAL MED. 72, 73 (2013). 
DeJong et al., supra note 68, at 1287. 
See The Financial, A1edical 
Consultations, 16 J. TECH. L. & PoL'Y 53, 63 (2011). 
76 An Act cm1ce1-nm 
Oct l, 2015) 
the Facilitation ofTelehealth, 2015 CoNN. ACTS No. 15-88(11)(c) (effective 
Safe Internet Act, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit 16 § 4744 (2017). 
78 Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 607 (Cal. 1993). 
79 at 599. 
Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W2d 495 (Wis. 1996) that evidence 
lack of was admissible). 
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telemedicine should be regulated in accordance with the constraints applied to all 
physician-patient relationships. 
Another meaningful complication to the physician-patient relationship in telemedicine 
comes at the point of termination: how, precisely, does a doctor terminate a virtual 
physician-patient relationship? Ricks v. Budge provides a quintessential description of 
the obligations of doctors when it comes to termination. 81 A doctor treated a patient's 
hand injury and told him to come back if the injury got worse. When the patient returned, 
the doctor refused treatment because the patient had yet to pay his bills. 82 The patient 
walked in the rain to another hospital and ultimately had to have his finger amputated. 
The court described the obligation of a physician in an ongoing relationship as follows: 
"The obligation of continuing attention can be terminated only by the cessation of the 
necessity which gave rise to the relationship, or by the discharge of the physician by 
the patient, or by the withdrawal from the case by the physician after giving the patient 
reasonable notice."83 This continues to reflect the state of the law and the contractual 
nature of the physician-patient relationship. 
Telemedicine complicates the matter. Many telemedicine companies will match patients 
with any qualified doctor, lacking the priority of maintaining long-term physician-
patient relationships. This is not inherent to telemedicine by any means, but it is apparent 
in many companies' business models. 84 Telemedicine highlights the expected tradeoff 
between instant access and the guarantee of meeting with your personal physician. 85 If 
a patient presents via telemedicine with a chronic illness, such as diabetes, however, a 
more difficult set of questions arises. 86 American Well, one of the largest telemedicine 
companies, explicitly tells its doctor that it "operates as an urgent care model."87 But 
what if a patient presents with a potential respiratory infection but then is diagnosed with 
a chronic illness-does the physician have an obligation to treat the chronic condition? 
Consent again becomes relevant in the context of termination. As Granade explains 
regarding these "abandonment" claims in the case of telemedicine, there must be 
"unilateral severance of the physician-patient relationship by the doctor" in order to 
81 Ricks 64 P2d 208, 212(Utah1937) 
82 Id. at 210. 
83 Id. at 211. 
84 See, e.g., DeJong et al., supra note 68, at 1288 ("Most websites do not allow to request 
with a "). 
85 
where may be less mobile and a large interactions. For a 
meta-assessment oftelemedicine's use in chronic diseases, see Richard Wootton, Twenty Years 
in Chronic Disease lvfanagement An Evidence 18 J. TELEMEDICINE & 
TELECARE 211, 21J (2012). 
86 This as of now, is very 
disclaimers what type of illnesses 
But see Jonah Comstock, Teladoc Plans Chronic Lo,rzdzlw;rz-i'OCictse 
MOBIHEALTH NEWS (May 18, 2016), 
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have a claim. 88 This is a reasonable standard, as patients should always have the ability to 
opt out of the relationship but cannot continue to hold the physician liable. Telemedicine 
can permissibly limit the extent of the physician-patient relationship to the relevant 
encounter as a result. The law can also recognize that consumers are typically aware of 
the fact that they are only receiving episodic treatment through telemedicine. 
This is precisely what Ohio law does by finding that explicit notice of termination is not 
required when "[t]he physician rendered medical service to the person on an episodic 
basis ... and the physician should not reasonably expect that related medical service 
will be rendered to the patient in the future." 89 In general, it seems that telemedicine 
companies are relying on their respective business models to channel patients into the 
appropriate physician-patient relationship. 
The formation of the physician-patient relationship can clearly occur via telemedicine.90 
The actual contents of such a relationship and its potential termination pose more 
difficult challenges, but ones that can still be reconciled through the existing legal 
framework. This entire argument is naturally contingent upon the presumption that we 
believe telemedicine is a valuable technology. If evidence mounts that telemedicine 
interactions are creating significant harm, the technology can be limited through state 
legislatures and medical boards. Medicine is heavily regulated and there is considerable 
risk (i.e., loss oflicense and prison) for practicing illegally.91 Alternatively, in the area of 
international law, a ban may or may not be effective depending on a variety of factors. 92 
The fact that regulation can limit telemedicine with such certainty means legal disruption 
will be a consequence of policy judgments and not the inevitable consequence of the 
technology's existence. 
IV. TELEMEDICINE AND PHYISICIAN LICENSURE 
A. State Power to Protect Its Citizens is the Basis For Our Licensure System 
The ability of the state to regulate itself under the police power is a core component of 
the U.S. Constitution's federalist structure. The Supreme Court affirmed this principle 
in Dent v. West Virginia, unanimously upholding a state statute restricting the right 
to practice medicine. 93 The Court gave significant deference to the right of the states 
despite a then-recognized countervailing individual right to pursue a profession of 
one's choosing. 
The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people 
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or 
tends to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, 
as well as deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the 
88 See Granade, supra note at 83. 
89 Omo REv. CoDE. ANN. 473 l.27.02(B)(l). 
90 See AA1A 5 0-State note 69. 
91 TEx. Occ. ConE § 165.153. 
92 See Rebecaa Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: 36 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 1837, 1884-90 (2015) factors relevant to the effectiveness of a weapons ban). 
93 129 U.S. l ( l 889) 
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practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits a 
certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently 
rely. The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily 
upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity. 94 
The right of a state to control medical licensing, therefore, remains strongly supported 
by existing precedent.95 Like other forms of occupational licensing, the right to control 
the quality of medical services is a core function of state government. 
The policy logic of state-based licensing of medicine, however, has received significant 
pushback as telemedicine becomes more attractive. As physicians become capable of 
treating patients throughout the country via virtual visits, the requirements of state-
based licensing limit physicians to treating patients only in those states in which they 
are licensed. One scholar identified the tension between the parochial state-based 
licensing system and technological advances in medicine.96 Some have argued that the 
location of the physician, not the patient, should define the relevant licensing, but this 
view has been consistently rejected in court.97 Teladoc, one of the earliest and largest 
telemedicine companies, successfully obtained a preliminary injunction against a Texas 
Medical Board regulation effectively preventing the practice of telemedicine on anti-
trust grounds.98 Challenges to the state-based regulation of telemedicine are evidently 
coming from all angles.99 
To be clear, this Article does not contend that the state-based licensing system is 
necessarily optimal. Rather, it recognizes that the right of a state to control occupational 
licensing is the legal underpinning of the current licensure system, as confirmed in 
Dent. 100 The key question, then, is whether the state-based licensing system can and 
should withstand the development of telemedicine. Put another way, does the removal 
of physicality (i.e., the patient being in the room with the doctor) fundamentally alter the 
underlying logic of the regulatory scheme for licensing? While telemedicine certainly 
demands new policies, it should not disrupt our recognition of states' occupational 
licensing rights in our federalist system for two reasons: first, this issue has already been 
presented and adequately address in other forms; second, there are innovative means 
of reconciling telemedicine with the existing licensing system, most notably through 
interstate licensure compacts. 101 Telemedicine would be disruptive of current licensure 
94 Id at 122. 
95 Bui see Bill Marino et al., A lemedh;ine in the Wake 
that recent Court 
health, and therefore a federal 
licensure scheme would 
96 Sulentic, supra note 2, at 4. 
97 See consensus" among state boards that 
0'-'"·"~"'«' purposes). 
98 Teladoc, Inc. v Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1-15-CV-343 RP, 2015 WL 8773509 (WD. Tex. Dec. 15, 
2015) 
99 See 
100 Dent West 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889). 
101 See Section IVC. 
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laws if it became optimal to grant licensing control to another body (e.g., the federal 
government) in order to accommodate the benefits oftelemedicine. 
B. States Already Allow the Interstate Practice Of Medicine In Various Forms 
Before considering how states and institutions respond to a new technology, the existing 
scheme may instruct how to address similar challenges. This section describes where 
the state-based licensing system has given way to allow effective health care operations, 
namely consultations by out-of-state physicians and treatment by physicians when a 
patient is traveling out of state. In each area, state-based licensing tends to bend but 
not break. 
When it comes to consultations from out-of-state doctors, there is a clear willingness 
to bypass the state-based licensing requirement. The logic behind such policies is that 
doctors should be able to consult with specialists and other doctors that may not be 
licensed in the state where the patient is located. California has an explicit consultation 
exception, though the out-of-state physician may not have "ultimate authority over 
the care or primary diagnosis of a patient who is located within [Califomia]."102 Ohio 
offers a similar exception as long as the physician does not provide regular or frequent 
consultation, provides the consultation without compensation, or the consultation is 
provided as part of a medical school curriculum. 103 It would be difficult to classify 
such consultations as anything but the practice of medicine, even if the out-of-state 
physician never actually speaks with the patient. The physicians are clearly advising on 
a specific course of treatment based upon their knowledge as a physician. Yet state law 
recognizes the desirability of such consultations, and therefore allows an exception to 
its licensure laws. 
Another notable exception is one that most health care consumers likely take for 
granted: the ability to receive treatment from an at-home physician while traveling 
out of state. 104 A patient on vacation in California gets a virus and calls her primary 
physician in New York, who prescribes some sort of medication to a local pharmacy. 
Ohio allows a physician from another state to provide "follow-up services in person 
or through the use of any communication" for one year after the last date that services 
were provided. 105 State control still governs these physician-patient interactions, but 
exceptions are allowed in the interest of the health and safety. 
There are a variety of other exceptions to physician licensure laws that I have not 
assessed in full detail here, such as emergency situations, 106 military exemptions, 107 
102 CAL Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 2060 (West 2017). 
103 Omo REV. CooE. ANN.§ 4731.36(A)(3) 2017) 
104 This service is 
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border state exceptions, 108 and even exceptions for visiting sports team trainers. 109 
The takeaway from this section is that while state control is the core legal backbone of 
existing licensure law, various exceptions to this requirement are already recognized. 
Any argument that telemedicine requires a fundamental shift in our licensing system 
ought to acknowledge that our deference to state control does not necessarily result in 
an extremely rigid system. 
C. States Can Achieve The Benefits Of Telemedicine Through Interstate Lie ensure 
And Other Legislative Initiatives 
States currently have the right to establish requirements for the practice of medicine in 
their state. A state also has the right, therefore, to offer a significantly expedited licensing 
process for individuals that have already been vetted by some other credible institution 
(e.g., another state's licensing board). Such processes are particularly attractive for areas 
in which a state has a shortage of licensed doctors. This is the basic theory behind 
interstate licensure compacts, in which participating states create fast-track license 
application processes for those with licenses in other states that are members of the 
compact. 110 Note, critically, that this does not necessarily create a new national licensing 
standard. Individual doctors must still obtain licenses in all states in which they practice, 
but the process is meaningfully easier. 111 Such compacts have been used effectively 
in the area of nursing for nearly two decades. In 1998, the National Council of State 
Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) promulgated the Nurse Licensure Compact. 112 Since that 
time, twenty-five state legislatures have passed statutes recognizing the compact. 113 
Similar efforts have been made for EMS personnel. 114 
The attempt to create an interstate compact for doctors' licenses has been an even more 
controversial affair, though a recent agreement is cause for optimism on the issue. 
The Federation of State Medical Boards created and endorsed the Interstate Medical 
Licensure Compact (IMLC) in 2014. 115 Twenty-eight states participate in the IMLC, 
and supportive legislation has been introduced in six additional states. 116 Responses to 
the compact have been mixed. One author suggests that the compact will "undermin[ e] 
state sovereignty, as well as increas[ e] the power of a private bureaucratic organization to 
LAW § 6526.2 (Mc:Kirmey 
109 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3 ll .560(2)(d) (West 2017). 
110 Interstate Medical Licensure' ·~~-.~~· 
111 Id. 
114 NAT'L REGISTRY OF E!vlERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS, Recognition 
Interstate 
115 See Interstate Medical Licensure supra note 112. 
116 Id. that the Interstate Medical Licensure is "an ag:i·ee1ne1rrt 
and 1 •~r,n<n~·u 
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intervene in, define, and control the practice of medicine." 117 In many state legislatures, 
representatives advocating for the enactment argued that the bill would help address 
persistent doctor shortages, especially in rural areas. 118 While there are some legitimate 
complaints about the IMLC, a close reading indicates various ways in which it preserves 
the rights of states to control licensing. As Robert Pear acknowledged writing about 
the compact for the New York Times, "[I]t would preserve the authority of each state to 
regulate the practice of medicine within its borders."119 
Simply because we can accommodate telemedicine through state-based licensing does 
not mean we should. Indeed, there is no denying that a national licensure scheme would 
more easily facilitate the use of telemedicine. 120 A technology is not legally disruptive, 
however, simply because existing doctrine cannot perfectly accommodate it. The IMLC 
can be viewed as a compromise position that maintains state control over licensing while 
recognizing the need for telemedicine to have a role in our health care system. Even 
imagining legal disruption as a spectrum where telemedicine is somewhat disruptive of 
the existing licensing scheme, the doctrine does not break. 
States still retain significant control over licensing under the IMLC. First, and most 
transparently, the IMLC is entirely contingent upon the consent of the state legislatures. 121 
As the model act makes clear, the IMLC simply "creates another pathway for licensure 
and does not otherwise change a state's existing Medical Practice Act."122 The IMLC 
did not become binding on the original signatories, moreover, until at least seven 
states signed on. 123 Member states have considerable latitude to still deny an applicant 
for failing to meet any of the nine required criteria for physicians. 124 These criteria 
disqualify, for example, any physician whose license has received essentially any form of 
discipline from a licensing agency. 125 If a state has particularized continuing education 
requirements, the IMLC makes clear that participating physicians must comply. 126 
117 Jeremy The Interstate Medical Licensure 
20 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 20, 22 (2015). 
118 
the access 
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Finally, and critically if one has a more jaded view of the licensure system, states may 
still charge licensing fees. 127 
The IMLC is the broadest method of reconciling the growth and desirability of 
telemedicine with the right of states to control medical licensing. At both the federal and 
state level, however, there have been other attempts at creating narrow carve-outs to the 
state-based licensing system. In 2011, Representative Glenn Thompson introduced the 
Servicemembers' Telemedicine and E-Health Portability Act of 2011. 128 This bill would 
have authorized the Secretary of Defense to allow licensed health care professional to 
provide care to members of the Armed Forces at any location and regardless of where 
the professional or patient are located. 129 In 2009, New Mexico passed a statute (since 
repealed) stating that the medical board of the state shall issue a specific telemedicine 
license to any applicant with an unrestricted license to practice medicine in another 
state. 130 Tennessee similarly offered a telemedicine license until October 2016, 
but applied a stricter standard of care to telemedicine. 131 Various laws with similar 
implications are currently being considered across the country. 132 Finally, and more 
narrowly, some states have reciprocity agreements only with bordering states. 133 
There is a fundamental tension between the extent to which such interstate compacts 
and other licensing accommodations can allow for telemedicine while respecting 
states' rights. A national licensing scheme, naturally, would be the most effective way 
to promote telemedicine, but would obviate the states' role in licensing. On the other 
end of the spectrum, a completely patchwork system of state schemes with unique 
licensing criteria would make interstate practice of telemedicine exceedingly difficult. 
The IMLC and other legislation fails to appreciate the immense logistical challenges of 
operating multiple state licenses. In one survey of practitioners who held multiple state 
licenses, those who encountered difficulty primarily identified"[ d]o not respond to calls 
or e-mails" and "[d]o not provide updates as to what is missing" as the main issues. 134 
127 See id. at§ 6(a); see also 
8, 2014), mnY11um;w nlhv<1r1'm<•mp1•ldv 
that protection of licensure fees constitutes the main reason for the maintenance of state-based 
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As the researchers noted, respondents who identified unreasonable state boards gave 
reasons that "dealt primarily with communication issues."135 By requiring doctors to 
obtain licenses in all states of practice, rather than an automatic reciprocity agreement, 
perhaps we are closer to the patchwork end of the spectrum than it would seem. 
Other authors have more completely sketched out the models for responding to the 
licensure issues created by telemedicine. 136 This Article does not seek to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the potential licensure systems. Rather, the objective is only to 
provide some emblematic examples and illustrate how these efforts attempt to maintain 
state control as the core structure of the licensing system. 137 The IMLC is precisely one 
way of answering this question while still respecting state control over licensing. In that 
regard, telemedicine's serious potential value to health care is accommodated under the 
existing legal regime. 
V. TELEMEDICINE AND INFORMATION PRIVACY 
A. Current Health Information Privacy Law Strikes A Difficult Balance Between 
Utility And Security 
Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis warned as early as 1890 that "numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in 
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' 138 The concern stemmed from 
the newly available technology of instantaneous photographs, a quite minor privacy 
threat relative to that posed by the potential release of Protected Health Information 
(PHI). 139 In the piece, Warren and Brandeis argue that the common law guarantees the 
right of each person to decide "to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
shall be communicated to others."140 This argument is accepted in the courts, at least 
to an extent, but it only addresses the question of how to punish or compensate for 
invasions of privacy. 141 Alternatively, the challenge of privacy in medicine is how to 
regulate personal information that by necessity must be seen by at least some beyond 
the individual themselves. 
13s Id 
136 See Heather A. Te!emedicine: The Invisible Barriers the Health Care Future, 9 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 89 (2000). 
137 See Sulentic, supra note 2, at 29 (identifying how the telemedicine issue 
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Privacy presents a distinct set of issues from those raised by licensing and the 
physician-patient relationship for three reasons. 142 First, regulation of privacy occurs 
through federal statute as opposed to state law (licensing) or a combination of state law 
and judicial doctrine (physician-patient relationship ). 143 The key pieces of legislation 
are the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)144 and 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH 
Act). 145 Second, these regulations frequently attempt to hold possessors of private 
information liable for the criminal activities of other actors (e.g., hackers). Third, 
health care policy-makers mostly agree that the digitization of medicine, especially 
when it comes to Electronic Health Records (EHR), is a positive development. Since 
May 2011, more than $35 billion dollars in incentives have been awarded through 
the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program. 146 The HITECH Act "allocates 
approximately $44,000 for each practicing clinician and between $2 million and $10 
million for each hospital that qualifies as a 'meaningful' user of EHRs."147 In early 
2009, then President-Elect Obama announced the goal of computerizing all medical 
records within five years. 148 
There is a fundamental tradeoff between the digitization of medical records and 
protection of patient privacy. As Lawrence 0. Gastin noted before HIPAA passed, some 
scholarship wrongfully "assumes that a significant level of privacy can coexist with 
the development of a modem health information infrastructure."149 In fact, security 
142 This Part discusses the privacy component of PHI and does not focus on the data access 
component of health infonnation. Many states have statutes guaranteeing patients access to their 
own health information. See Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy laws and the Impact 
of the Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y, L., & ETHICS 327, 329 (2002); see 
also Hugo Campos, The Heart of the Matter: I Can~ Access the Data Generated by My Implanted 
Defibrillator: That's Absurd, SLATE (Mar. 24, 2015) (arguing for stronger rights to the data created 
by various medical technologies), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology /future_ tense/2015/03/ 
patients _should_ be_ allowed_ to_ access_ data _generated_ by _implanted_ devices.html. 
143 Privacy is hardly an exclusive concern of the federal government, and states are generally not 
preempted from creating additional privacy protections to supplement the federal laws. See, e.g., 
Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W2d 34 (Minn. Ct App. 2009) (holding that Minnesota's law 
providing private right of action for HIPAA violations was not preempted). 
144 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
145 The HITECH Act was enacted as an amendment under the investment recovery act following 
the late 2000s financial crisis. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5 Div. A tit. XIII, lllth Cong. (2009). 
146 See Payment Data: State Breakdown of Payments to Medicare and Medicaid Providers Through 
February 28, 2017, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS), http://www.cms.gov/ 
regulations-and-guidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/dataandreports.html. 
147 Ashlsh K. Jha, Meaningful Use of Electronic Health Records: The Road Ahead, Commentary, 
304 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1709, 1709 (2010). 
148 Dan Childs et al., President-Elect Urges Electronic Medical Records in 5 Years, ABC NEWS 
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149 Lawrence 0. Gastin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 451, 454-55 (1995) 
(footnote omitted). 
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has proven difficult in practice. 150 In 2015 alone, over 113 million health care related 
records were stolen; health care suffered more data breaches than any other industry, 
including government and retail. 151 Yet the push for health care digitization continues, 
albeit with attempts along the way to protect PHI. 152 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the potential for a privacy violation does not 
constitute a violation of privacy alone. 153 In Whalen v. Roe, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of the New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972.154 
The Act required the creation of a centralized computer file that tracked the name 
and addresses of all individuals who had been prescribed certain dangerous drugs. 
The Court acknowledged the "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information."155 Nevertheless, the Court held that New York's 
statute "evidence[d] a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in 
privacy."156 Therefore, while some courts recognize a constitutional right to the privacy 
of health information, the mere existence of potential privacy invasions does not raise 
constitutional concerns. 
The basic legal and policy underpinning of data privacy in health care is a balance 
between utility and security. HIPAA, for the most part, requires providers to act according 
to standards instead of follow rules. As Peter A. Winn has argued when describing 
the lack of privacy in a hospital setting, "[h]ospital stays are notoriously non-private 
affairs."157 The drastic increase in digitization, however, has certainly made the issue 
more prominent and potentially dangerous. Telemedicine fundamentally disturbs this 
equilibrium by pushing another meaningful component of health care-the consultation 
itself---online. This shift creates new demands on providers to ensure adequate privacy 
protections of audio and video communications. The basic legal doctrine, however, 
remains the same: providers must protect patient data to the best extent possible and 
patients must be wary of the risk of breaches. 
150 Id. at 493. 
were stolen). 
152 There are efforts to utilize machine mt1;11!;'1;enlce, and other advanced 
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this initiative, see Filippo Pesapane et al., as a Medical Device in 
Ethical in Europe and the United States, 9 INSIGHTS INTD IMAGING 745 (2018). 
ls3 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (l 977). 
154 Id. at 600. 
155 Id. at 605. 
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157 Peter A. Winn, in 
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B. Existing Regulation Of E-Mail And Data Breaches Promote Digitization 
Online medical consultations do not constitute the first electronic communication of 
sensitive health information between physicians and their patients. The regulation 
surrounding the use of e-mail and text messaging provides a useful point of initial 
comparison. Doctors may legally use non-encrypted e-mail services (e.g., Gmail) to 
communicate with their patients, but there are significant limitations on this use. 158 
For example, doctors must take certain precautions when sending the e-mail (e.g., 
double-check the recipient) and, more importantly, should "limit the type of information 
disclosed" through the messages. 159 In order to be HIPAA compliant in e-mail use, a 
provider still must meet the security requirements outlined by HIPAA, such as access, 
control, and integrity. 160 While HIPAA requires certain security measures (e.g., unique 
user identification), 161 encryption is considered "addressable" and only required 
whenever deemed appropriate. 162 As one advisory organization put it, "Essentially, 
you can send [electronic protected health information] via email, but you have to do it 
securely, on HHS terms."163 
The patient plays a meaningful role on this issue and may consent to the use of an 
unencrypted communication as long as the provider has advised the patient of the 
risk. 164 The theme of consent emerges again, this time with the patient able to accept 
data privacy risks in exchange for the value of seamlessly communicating with their 
provider. 165 The regulation of e-mail demonstrates that the general requirement for 
cybersecurity is not a demand for absolute security at all costs but rather a desire for 
balancing utility and security. 166 
158 Office for Civil Rights, Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Permit Health Care Providers To Use 
E-mail To Discuss Health Issues and Treatmentvvith Their Patients?, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND 




160 See 45 C.FR. § 164.312; see also 
161 45 C.FR. § 164.312(a)(2)(i) (2013) 
& E-mail, supra note 158. 
162 45 C.FR. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2013). "Addressable" means that encryption is not fully 
mandatory and need only be implemented after a determination by the entity that it is a "reasonable 
and appropriate safeguard." See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services: Health Information 
Privacy, Is the Use of Encryption in the http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
profe ssio nais/faq/200 1 /is-the-use-of-encryption-mandatory -in-the-security-rule/index.html. 
163 Sending HIPAA 101: The Ways to Send PHI, SECURITYMETRICS, at 
101-1, http://www.securitymetrics.com/static/resources/orange/HIPAA _Compliant_ Emails_ White_ 
Paper.pdf. 
164 See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules 
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
5,566, 5,634 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.FR. §§ 160, 164) ("We clarify !hat covered 
entities are permitted to send individuals unencrypted emails if they have advised the individual of 
the risk, and the individual still prefers the unencrypted email."). 
165 Id. 
166 See id. 
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New entities must consider such tradeoffs. Beyond the challenges created for providers, 
HIPAA also requires that "Business Associates" of covered entities comply with 
HIPAA. 167 As HHS explains, "The Privacy Rule requires that a covered entity obtain 
satisfactory assurances from its business associate that the business associate will 
appropriately safeguard the protected health information it receives or creates on behalf 
of the covered entity."168 The business associate must consent to compliance through 
a Business Associate Agreement (BAA) with the covered entity. 169 The digitization 
of health information has greatly expanded the number and types of organizations 
that must sign BAAs. Early examples of BAAs from HHS include third party 
administrators and independent medical transcriptionists. 170 Now, however, Google 
will sign a BAA (but only with its paying customers). 171 Verizon has begun offering 
HIPAA-compliant Virtual Contact Centers so that its clients can communicate PHI over 
Verizon networks. 172 An entire marketplace has opened up for such HIPAA-compliant 
communication platforms. 173 The health care industry, due to its size and breadth and 
now its digitization, touches a more diverse array of companies. 
A final question to consider is who should ultimately be responsible when a security 
breach occurs. Enforcement of penalties for security breaches thus far demonstrate 
that we are far from a system of strict liability. 174 Under the HITECH Act, covered 
entities must notify HHS and affected individuals of a breach affecting more than 
500 people. 175 Yet a ProPublica analysis found that, through 2014, the HHS Office for 
Civil Rights fined only twenty-two organizations despite over 1,140 large breaches, a 
167 See Office for Civil Rights, Business Associates, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 
1 (Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Business Associates], http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html. Per HHS, a Business Associate is "a person or 
entity that performs certain functions or activities that involve the use of disclosure of protected 
health information on behalf of, or provides services to, a covered entity." Id 
168 Id. 
169 45 C.FR. § 164.502(e)(2) ("The satisfactory assurances required by paragraph (e)(l) of this 
section must be documented through a written contract or other written agreement or arrangement 
with the business associate."). 
170 Business Associates, supra note 167, at 2. 
171 HIPAA Compliance & Data Protection w ilh Google Apps: Google Apps for Work HIP PA 
Implementation Guide, GooGLE FOR WoRK (Feb. 2015), http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/ 
gsuite.google.com/en//files/hipaa-implementation-gnide.pdf 
172 Verizon Unveils Nerv HIPAA-Ready Solutions, Verizon (Oct 23, 2014), http://www.verizon.co1n/ 
about/news/hipaa-healthcare-contact-center-solutions. 
173 See eVisit, http://evisit.com/resources/telemedicine-platform/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see 
also Hale, http://www.hale.co/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
174 See Charles Ornstein, Fines Remain Rare Even as Health Data Breaches Multiply, NPR: SHOTS 
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/02/27 /389328345/fines-remain-rare-
even-as-health-data-breaches-multiply. 
175 See Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information: Interim Final Rule, 74 
Fed. Reg. 42,740 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.FR. §§ 160, 164). Before this federal 
legislation, roughly thirty-three states had their own legislation requiring some sort of disclosure in 
case of a breach. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 
105 MICH. L. REv. 913, 915 (2007). 
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rate of less than 2%. 176 Admittedly, there are other means of enforcing punishments 
for data breaches, such as class actions. 177 Paul Schwartz and Edward Janger discuss 
the "reputational sanction" involved with breach disclosure requirements. 178 Still, two 
reasonable inferences can be made from the overall low level of enforcement. 179 First, a 
data breach itself does not guarantee that the breached company violated HIPAA or any 
other law. Second, a company may follow all of the relevant HHS guidelines and still be 
vulnerable to an attack from a sophisticated breach. From the perspective of legislators 
and policy-makers, a reasonable number of breaches may be an acceptable consequence 
of health care digitization. 
C. Some New Privacy Rules May Be Required For Telemedicine 
The fundamental change created by telemedicine is that the physician-patient 
consultation moves online. All other elements, such as prescriptions and sharing of 
PHI through medical charts or other means, already exist electronically. 180 Moving 
the consultation from the private confines of an office to the web does have unique 
and serious consequences. 181 One overarching result is that the change places another 
weight on the scales of utility in its tension with security. 182 As such risky functionality 
becomes more accessible and enticing, consumers are going to expect security in their 
interactions. 
One scholar has expressed a hope that telemedicine patients are not having appointments 
over public Wi-Fi. 183 While perhaps an exaggeration, this is the type of easy access 
that telemedicine seems to promise. While coffee shop Wi-Fi is not ideal, it seems 
doubtful that any consumer would worry that their home Wi-Fi network is insufficiently 
protected for a telemedicine appointment. Mobile health applications suffer from this 
risk too, and the Food and Drug Administration has acknowledged that device security 
is "a shared responsibility between stakeholders, including ... patients, providers, and 
176 See Ornstein, supra note 174. 
177 After the Anthem Life Insurance Company data breach of over eighty million in 2015, 
over one hundred class actions were filed that were until 2018. See In re Anthem, Inc. 
Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2018 WL 3960068 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018); see 
also Anne Bucher, Anthem Jvfust Face Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit, 
ACTIONS (Feb. 19, 2016), 
178 See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 175, at 917. 
179 The ProPublica report focuses more on the lack of sufficient for the Office for 
Civil at HHS (fewer than 200 employees and a budget under $39 million as of the reporting). 
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manufacturers of medical devices."184 Patients bear some of the responsibility for device 
security, evidently, whether they know it or not. 185 
The first and clearest challenge posed by telemedicine is the potential hacking of the 
cameras themselves. A quick glance around a classroom of laptops usually reveals 
many people with tape covering their built-in cameras, and with good reason. 186 Video 
teleconferencing, as HIPAA describes it, however, is not covered under the "Security" 
portion of the HIPAA rule. 187 HHS guidance has provided that video teleconferencing 
is not considered electronic media under HIPAA. 188 The logic behind this exception 
is that HIPAA defines electronic media as requiring storage of data or transmission of 
information already stored as data. 189 If a telemedicine application records and stores 
the consultation, then it will be covered under the Security rule. 190 
The lack of coverage for video teleconferencing under the Security rule is at first 
surprising, but there are still various strong restrictions that demand concern for security. 
For one, states like California have passed their own legislation expanding the category 
of covered entities. 191 Second, there are market incentives for providers to guarantee to 
their customers (i.e., patients) that their telehealth consultations are secure. 192 Third, 
many applications offer functionality involving storage of ePHI that is covered under 
184 Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and Res., U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Content of 
Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in A1edical Devices: Guidance for 
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http://privacy.wv.gov/tips/Pages/HIPAAPrivacyHIPAASecurity.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
188 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8,334, 8,342 (Feb. 20, 2003) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164). 
189 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
190 See Adrien Vinches, HIPAA Considerations When Adding Video Calling To a Health App, 
SIGHTCALL (Nov. 13, 2014 ), http://www.sightcall.com/hipaa-considerations-adding-telehealth-video-
calling-health-app ("In other words, as long as your app does not record the consultation between 
the doctor and its patients, the video chat capability does not add additional requirements to meet in 
regards to the Security Rule."). 
191 See CAL. Civ. CODE§ 56.06(b) (West 2019) ("Any business that offers software or hardware 
to consumers, including a mobile application or other related device that is designed to maintain 
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the Security Rule. 193 The fact that the live transmission of PHI (e.g., my doctor and I 
discuss a private health matter during a telemedicine consultation) is not covered should 
not be viewed as an embrace of utility over security. 194 Iftelemedicine takes off as many 
analysts predict, HIPAA may be expanded to cover live videoconferencing. 
Regardless of these other protections, audio-visual transmission of PHI, via a 
consultation or otherwise, should be covered by HIP AA even if the data is not stored. 195 
Perhaps those crafting the updated HIPAA rules did not anticipate such a large volume 
of health care interactions would occur online, and felt this was an unnecessary burden. 
For example, the standard phone call between a doctor and patient is not covered under 
HIPAA. 196 It would create undesirable transaction costs if it were, and telemedicine may 
seem like a close analogy to the phone call. As telemedicine becomes an explicit point of 
treatment, however, this logic should change. This is not a legal disruption. This change 
would indicate a shift toward greater recognition of the need for security in non-stored 
information. 197 Patients could still potentially consent to non-secure communication 
forms and there are already HIPAA compliant platforms for telemedicine that would 
meet the providers' demand. 
Another security challenge that telemedicine creates is authentication. When a doctor 
enters into a virtual office and begins speaking with a new patient via videoconference, 
how can that doctor confirm the patient's identity?198 Much of the literature in this space 
recommends the use of two-factor authentication systems, but there is a concern for 
maintaining the quick and easy access seemingly promised by telemedicine. 199 The 
American Telemedicine Association explicitly states in its guidance documents that "[i] 
f multi-factor authentication is available, it should be used."200 HIPAA requires that 
covered entities "[i]mplement procedures to verify that a person or entity seeking access 
to [ePHI] is the one claimed."201 These requirements reflect the overall sentiment of 
193 Office for Civil Rights, Answered t,:u'"'turts, 
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HIPAA and PHI regulation: manage your risk and take reasonable precautions, but 
otheiwise utilize the technology. 
The alternative to such a system would be to impose strict liability for any breach of 
patient privacy, regardless of the level of care that went into protecting the PHI. Breach 
notification requirements are arguably a type of strict reputational liability. 202 In 2015, 
the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, Insurance, and Data 
Security held a hearing on data security concurrently with the breach of eighty million 
individual records at Anthem Life Insurance Co.203 During the hearing, various industry 
representatives attempted to make one thing clear to the Senators: breaches are very 
unfortunate events, but "no system---even the most protected one money can buy-is 
ever 100 percent secure."204 The overall tone of each industry representative (and most 
Senators) was that this is an expected price to pay for technological innovation, and we 
must require breach notification and that companies be diligent in their protection of 
data.205 The responses thus far to security concerns over telemedicine appear to reflect 
this same balancing effort. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Telemedicine is not legally disruptive. Yet simply saying that telemedicine is not legally 
disruptive fails to capture the true and significant effects of telemedicine on existing 
health law. First, a technology is not legally disruptive in a broad sense but only in 
particular areas of application.206 In some cases, a technology may create drastic 
change that is completely disruptive of the entire legal regime, but this will be rare.207 A 
technology may also create such minimal change as to certainly not be legally disruptive 
at all (e.g., the electronic car window). Generally, technologies will more frequently 
disrupt at one level down (and further). 
Second, some changes are still clearly needed m order to effectively incorporate 
telemedicine into the health care system. The risk of over-prescribing of dangerous 
substances via telemedicine is clearly a challenge that will require additional regulation 
and consideration by the medical community.208 The IMLC has only been adopted in 
twenty-eight states. If that number does not increase, many states will be effectively 
shut out from the benefits oftelemedicine.209 HIPAA will have to be updated to cover 
202 See on Data 
S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prof., Prod Ins., and Data Sec., 114th 
of Cheri F McGuire, Vice President of Global Government Affairs and 
203 See id at 57 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Member, S. Comm on Commerce, Sci., & 
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non-stored information in order to minimize telemedicine security risks. The takeaway 
from this Article is absolutely not that existing law is completely sufficient and 
telemedicine creates no legal challenge. Rather, the argument is that most of the benefits 
of telemedicine can be obtained while maintaining the underlying doctrines. 
Changes to the underlying law will affect other elements of health care. Creation of new 
technology-specific rules or clarification of uncertainty does nothing to the underlying 
doctrine or other types of technologies or activities it regulates. When the justification 
for a law has been disrupted, however, the entire legal framework must be revisited, 
including how the laws apply to activities that previously operated under settled 
doctrines. Disciplinary systems, specialist boards, and various other roles currently 
played by state medical boards would all require updating iftelemedicine truly disrupted 
state-based licensing. 
Finally, we can only assess the legal disruptiveness of a technology at a given point in 
time. Technology could evolve such that it would be ludicrous to maintain underlying 
legal doctrines as applied to telemedicine. If enough of medicine moved to the 
virtual world, this may or may not disrupt the legal role of the hospital in areas like 
corporate negligence.210 Attempting to predict the future use of telemedicine and its 
legal implications would be a fool's errand. Instead, scholars and policy-makers should 
remain aware of the state of the technology, acknowledge the underpinnings of existing 
doctrine, and only disrupt as necessary. 
21° For one assessment of what a of the future may look like, sec How nn,·m,•ms 
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